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ABSTRACT 
Australia’s decision to implement Internet censorship using 
technological means creates a natural experiment:  it can become 
the first Western democracy to mandate filtering legislatively and 
to retrofit it to a decentralized network.  But are the proposed 
restrictions legitimate?  The new restraints derive from the Labor 
Party’s pro-filtering electoral campaign, though minority 
politicians have considerable influence over policy.  The country 
has a well-defined statutory censorship system that may, however, 
be undercut by relying on foreign and third-party lists of sites to be 
blocked.  While Australia is open about its filtering goals, the 
government’s transparency about what content is to be blocked is 
poor.  Initial tests show that how effective censorship is at filtering 
prohibited content—and only that content—will vary based on 
what method ISPs use.  Though Australia’s decision-makers are 
formally accountable, efforts to silence dissenters, outsourcing of 
blocking decisions, and filtering’s inevitable transfer of power to 
technicians undercut accountability.  This Article argues that 
Australia represents a shift by Western democracies towards 
legitimating Internet filtering and away from robust consideration 
of the alternatives available to combat undesirable information. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Australia’s decision to impose mandatory Internet censorship 
through technology—”filtering,” as it is known in cyberlaw—puts 
the country at the forefront of the spread of this practice from 
authoritarian regimes such as China and Iran to Western 
democratic nations.1  This Article describes Australia’s proposed 
filtering system in its technical and legal aspects and assesses both 
the legitimacy of this censorship and its likely effects on debates 
over online information controls.2  In short, while much depends 
on how Australia implements restrictions, current plans raise 
concerns about the transparency and accountability of the 
government’s efforts, and may create a clash between efforts to 
block unlawful content and to expand broadband access.  
Moreover, the dynamics created by filtering may inevitably lead 
Australia to expand the scope of material blocked.  Australia’s 
efforts create a fascinating experiment in Internet censorship by 
Western democracies. 
Australia is not the first Western country to implement Internet 
censorship, but its proposed system is unique in several important 
respects.  First, the current government, led by the Labor Party, 
 
1 See generally ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET 
FILTERING (Ronald Deibert et al. eds. 2008).  I use the terms “filtering” and 
“censorship” interchangeably.  See generally OPENNET INITIATIVE, ABOUT FILTERING, 
http://opennet.net/about-filtering (last visited Dec. 5., 2009); Jonathan Zittrain, 
Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. REV. 653 (2003). 
2 Two cautions are in order.  First, Australia’s filtering system has yet to be 
implemented and its configuration and details may change.  Second, the author is 
an American attorney, not an Australian one, which inevitably affects the Article’s 
analysis. 
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made filtering a key aspect of its program during its electoral 
campaigning.3  The government thus has a tenable claim to a 
democratic mandate for Internet censorship.  Second, Australia 
plans to mandate censorship by law, rather than through informal 
pressure on Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) (as the United 
Kingdom has done)4 or through partial measures aimed at 
intermediaries such as search engines (as France and Germany 
have done). 5  This is the first time that a Western democracy will 
require, through formal statute, ISPs to block users from accessing 
certain materials online.  Third, the criteria by which sites will be 
designated for blocking remain opaque and uncertain; the 
government has vacillated between focusing on child pornography 
sites6 and suggesting that other topics, such as hate speech and 
violence, could also be banned. 7  Most Western nations that censor 
the Net specify closely the material that is blocked.  Finally, the 
government appears willing to trade performance degradation to 
block suspect sites; a pilot test of filtering found decreases in access 
speeds from 2% to 86%.8  This creates tension between Labor’s 
 
3 Andrew Hendry & Darren Pauli, “Appalled” Opposition Hits Back at Conroy’s 
Internet Censorship, COMPUTERWORLD, Oct. 24, 2008, http://www.computerworld 
.com.au/index.php/id;879301684;fp;4194304;fpid;1 (quoting “shadow broadband 
minister” Senator Nick Minchin who observed that “Labor went to the election 
and won on the basis of this, frankly, very heavy-handed one-size-fits-all ISP-
based content filter”). 
4 See Frank Fisher, Caught in the Web, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 17, 2008, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jan/17/caughtintheweb 
(detailing the UK government’s effort to suppress certain content by demanding 
that ISPs voluntarily opt into a system that has not been discussed or debated by 
the legislature). 
5 See OpenNet Initiative, Europe, http://opennet.net/research/regions 
/europe (last visited Dec. 3, 2009) (observing that both France and Germany have 
worked with search engines to remove illegal content and hate speech). 
6 See, e.g., STEPHEN CONROY, LABOR’S PLAN FOR CYBER-SAFETY 5 (2007), available 
at http://www.alp.org.au/download/now/labors_plan_for_cyber_safety.pdf 
(stating “Labor’s ISP policy will prevent Australian children from accessing any 
content that has been identified as prohibited by [the Australian Communications 
and Media Authority], including sites such as those containing child pornography 
and X-rated material”). 
7 See Senator Conroy Expands Reach of Net Filters to “Unwanted Content,” 
ITNEWS AUSTRALIA, Nov. 13, 2008, http://www.itnews.com.au/News/88908 
,senator-conroy-expands-reach-of-net-filters-to-unwanted-content.aspx (noting 
that net filters will be expanded to reach “unwanted content”). 
8 AUSTRALIAN COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA AUTHORITY, CLOSED 
ENVIRONMENT TESTING OF ISP-LEVEL INTERNET CONTENT FILTERING 41, 62–68 (June 
2008), available at http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/lib310554 
/isp-level_internet_content_filtering_trial-report.pdf. 
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policy goals, as increasing broadband access and access speeds are 
core tenets of the government’s platform.9 
The new government’s Internet censorship proposals have 
been controversial, spawning street protests,10 online petitions,11 
opposition from Internet industry groups,12 and critical press 
coverage. 13  Nonetheless, Australia is forging ahead with plans to 
test filtering.14 
Is Australia’s proposed Internet filtering legitimate?  Assessing 
censorship normatively is tricky; the most common method is to 
examine what content is proscribed and then articulate a position 
based on one’s view of that material.  However, the Internet is local 
where censorship is concerned.  Different countries, even 
democratic ones, make varying decisions.15  It may be legitimate 
for France to ban hate speech online and for the United States to 
permit it, even though the targeted content is the same.  In a 
separate Article, I propose moving from an ends-based analysis 
(examining what content is filtered) to a process-based 
methodology examining how censorship decisions are made and 
implemented.16 
To assess legitimacy, this process-based framework asks four 
questions.  First, is a country open about its Internet censorship and 
why it restricts information?  Second, is the state transparent about 
 
9  AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY, NATIONAL PLATFORM AND CONSTITUTION 23 
(2007), available at http://www.alp.org.au/platform/index.php. 
10 See Darren Pauli, Anti Internet Filtering Rebels Hit the Streets, 
COMPUTERWORLD, Dec. 3, 2008, http://www.computerworld.com.au/article 
/269615/anti_content_filtering_rebels_take_streets?fp=16&fpid=1 (describing 
protests that were arranged in Australia’s capital cities by members from 
organizations including the Electronic Freedom Project and the Digital Liberty 
Coalition). 
11 Computerworld, Save the Internet!, http://www.computerworld.com.au 
/user/login?destination=hands_off_the_internet (last visited Dec. 2, 2009). 
12 Hendry & Pauli, supra note 3. 
13 See, e.g., Jennifer Dudley-Nicholson, Australia’s Compulsory Internet Filtering 
“Costly, Ineffective,” THE COURIER-MAIL, Oct. 29, 2008, available at 
http://www.news.com.au/technology/story/0,25642,24569656-5014239,00.html. 
14 See Fran Foo, ISP Filtering Gathers Pace, AUSTRALIAN IT, Feb. 12, 2009, at 
http://www.australianit.news.com.au/story/0,24897,25043812-15306,00.html 
(noting ISPs were beginning to install their testing equipment). 
15 As John Perry Barlow noted, “in Cyberspace, the First Amendment is a 
local ordinance.”  John Perry Barlow, Leaving the Physical World, http://w2.eff.org 
/Misc/Publications/John_Perry_Barlow/HTML/leaving_the_physical_world 
.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2009). 
16 Derek E. Bambauer, Cybersieves, 59 DUKE L.J. 377 (2009). 
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what material it filters and what it leaves untouched?  Third, how 
narrow is filtering:  how well does the content that is actually 
blockedand not blockedcorrespond to those criteria?  Finally, 
to what degree are citizens and Internet users able to participate in 
decision-making about these restrictions, such that censors are 
accountable?17  Legitimate censorship is open, transparent about 
what is banned, effective yet narrowly targeted, and responsive to 
the preferences of each state’s citizens. 
The remainder of this Article explores the political, legal, and 
technological context of Australia’s Internet filtering plans in 
Sections 2, 3, and 4; assesses the legitimacy of the proposed 
program using the new process-based methodology in Section 5; 
and concludes with an initial evaluation of what this move means 
for larger debates around online information restrictions. 
2. POLITICAL CONTEXT 
Australia’s shift from voluntary filtering through software 
installed on individual computers to mandatory, ISP-based 
censorship resulted from a change in government.  The Labor 
Party replaced the Liberal Party in power, but with a key 
weakness:  its legislative program depended upon support from 
minority parties to pass in Australia’s Senate.  One of these parties, 
Family First, and its single Senator have pushed Labor to expand 
the scope of content filtered, despite substantial political 
opposition to the program. 
In November 2007, the Labor Party, led by Kevin Rudd, 
defeated the ruling Liberal Party of John Howard.18  While one 
issue in the campaign was Australia’s participation in the conflict 
in Iraq,19 Labor also included Internet policy topics in its platform, 
such as expanding broadband access and blocking sites with illegal 
material.20  The filtering proposal, which was released late in the 
 
17 Id. 
18 Rohan Sullivan, Bush Ally Howard Defeated in Australia, WASH. POST, Nov. 
25, 2007, at A17. 
19 Tim Johnston, Tough Race in Australia for Supporter of Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
23, 2007, at A24. 
20 See AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY, supra note 9, at 278 (“Labor is committed to 
improving the access of all Australians . . . to the benefits of broadband 
connectivity . . . [and] supports a requirement for internet service providers to 
offer a filtered ‘clean feed’ internet service to all households, schools and other 
public internet points accessible by children”).  See also Press Release, Senator 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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campaign,21 built on Labor’s plan from March 2006 to mandate that 
“clean feed” Internet access be offered to all schools, households, 
and public access points available to children.22  The Liberal Party, 
in contrast, advanced a filtering program, NetAlert, based on 
offering free software to parents and families,23 although the 
Howard government did order a test of ISP-based filtering that the 
new Rudd government continued.24 
During the campaign, Stephen Conroy, Labor’s shadow 
Minister for Communications and Information Technology, 
promulgated a detailed plan for cyber-safety that stated Labor 
would require “Internet Service Providers (ISPs) [to] filter out 
content that is identified as prohibited by the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority (ACMA),” and that the 
“ACMA ‘blacklist’ will be made more comprehensive to ensure 
that children are protected from harmful and inappropriate 
material.”25  The plan criticized the Howard government’s 
program offering free filtering software to parents, noting that a 
16-year-old (known as “The Porn Cracker”)26 was able to hack the 
software to bypass it.27  Moreover, despite a $22 million28 
 
Stephen Conroy, Minister Welcomes Advances in Internet Filtering Technology 
(July 28, 2008), http://www.minister.dbcde.gov.au/media/media_releases 
/2008/060 (releasing the findings of reports that tested the current effectiveness of 
commercial Internet Service Providers filtering products). 
21 The Last Modified date on the file containing the Cyber-Safety Plan is Nov. 
19, 2007; elections were held on Nov. 24, 2007.  CONROY, supra note 6.  See 
Stilgherrian, ACS Filter Report Just What Conroy Needs, ZDNET AUSTRALIA, Oct. 14, 
2009, http://www.zdnet.com.au/insight/security/soa/ACS-filter-report-just        
-what-Conroy-needs/0,139023764,339299029,00.htm (describing the Plan as 
“thrown together in the last few weeks before the November 2007 election, well 
after the rest of Labor’s policies had been published”). 
22 Press Release, Kim Beazley, Labor’s Plan to Protect Kids From Internet 
Pornography (Mar. 21, 2006), http://web.archive.org/web/20060422120043 
/http://www.alp.org.au/media/0306/msloo210.php. 
23 See New NetAlert—Proecting Australian Families Online Initiative Launched, 
ACMASPHERE (ACMA)  Sept. 2007, available at http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr 
/_assets/main/lib310211/acmasphere%20issue%2023.pdf. 
24 See AUSTRALIAN COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA AUTHORITY, supra note 8. 
25 CONROY, supra note 6, at 2. 
26 See Tom Wood, The Wood Verdict, http://thewoodverdict.blogspot.com/ 
(the “Porn Cracker’s” blog).  See also Nick Higginbottom & Ben Packham, Student 
Cracks Government’s $84m Porn Filter, HERALD SUN, Aug. 26, 2007 (on file with U. 
PA. J. INT’L L.) (reporting that the “Porn Cracker” was able to hack the software in 
thirty minutes). 
27 CONROY, supra note 6, at 4.  See also Meredith Booth, Adelaide Firm to Benefit 
as Businesses Tighten the Net, THE ADVERTISER, Nov. 11, 2008, at 37 (noting that 
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advertising budget, the NetAlert program29 achieved only 10% of 
the 1.4 million software downloads initially projected by the 
government.30  The Department of Broadband, Communications, 
and the Digital Economy estimated that only 29,000 of those 
downloads (2% of the target figure) were actually deployed and in 
use.31  Labor successfully portrayed NetAlert’s paucity of use as 
resulting from a failure of government rather than from a lack of 
public interest. 
After its victory at the polls, the new Labor government moved 
to implement its plan to prevent access to prohibited material 
online.  In its initial budget, the Rudd government allocated over 
$128 million for cyber safety and law enforcement,32 with over $44 
million dedicated to filtering.33  The government’s focus for online 
restrictions slowly broadened from its campaign focus on the 
ACMA blacklist to blocking content perceived as harmful more 
generally.  Conroy—now Minister for Broadband, 
Communications, and the Digital Economy—claimed that filters 
will block up to 10,000 Web sites.34  The Labor government’s  
proposal has proved controversial, drawing opposition from 
Internet industry groups (including Netchoice and the System 
Administrators Guild of Australia),35 free speech organizations 
(including Electronic Frontiers Australia),36 newspapers and other 
media outlets,37 librarians,38 and even some children’s groups (such 
 
NetFox, a tool that filters in real time, was forecasting small business demand for 
its product this year will boom). 
28 Currency figures are in Australian dollars unless noted otherwise. 
29 Australian Government, NetAlert, http://www.netalert.gov.au/ (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2009). 
30 Andrew Colley, Costs and Lack of Enthusiasm Threaten Free Net Nasty 
Blocking Plan, AUSTRALIAN, Feb. 26, 2008, at 29. 
31 Health Gilmore, Web Porn Software Filter Takes Biggest Hit, SUN HERALD 
(Sydney), Feb. 17, 2008, at 40. 
32 Glenn Mulcaster, Opposition Rises to Internet Filter, THE AGE (Melbourne), 
Nov. 11, 2008, at 5. 
33 Samela Harris, Op-Ed., The Hand That’s On Your Mouse . . .  and Why It Will 
Make Your Internet a Whole Lot Slower, ADVERTISER, Oct. 28, 2008, at 19. 
34 Graham Clark, Seven Days, COURIER-MAIL, Nov. 15, 2008, at 54. 
35 Mulcaster, supra note 32. 
36 Electronic Frontiers Australia, Labor’s Mandatory ISP Internet Blocking Plan, 
http://www.efa.org.au/censorship/mandatory-isp-blocking/ (last visited Dec. 3, 
2009). 
37 See, e.g., Editorial, Flawed Plan for Internet Control, CANBERRA TIMES, Jan. 3, 
2008, at 14 (criticizing government efforts to filter Internet content); Editorial, Net-
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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as Save the Children).39  Groups such as the Australian Christian 
Lobby, however, have been supportive.40  Minority party senators, 
such as Steve Fielding of the Family First Party, have pressured the 
government to expand blocking.41  Some stakeholders have 
supported filtering within limits, such as the child protection 
group Child Wise, which wants censorship limited to child 
pornography.42  ISPs have had mixed reactions, evincing concerns 
both about acting as censors and about losing influence over 
filtering policy if they fail to engage the government.43  Several 
major ISPs, though, have refused to participate in expanded trials 
of the filtering system.44  The Australian Computer Society (“ACS”) 
issued a mixed review of the proposal, cautioning that greater 
governmental specificity and data from multi-ISP trials are needed 
 
Nanny State Worth Watching, AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 3, 2008, at 9 (discussing worrying 
aspects of the government’s plan to filter Internet content); Computerworld, supra 
note 11 (voicing concerns over the government’s proposed Internet filtering plan). 
38 See, e.g., Paul Syvret, Net Censorship Under Attack, COURIER-MAIL, Jan. 19, 
2008, at 56 (quoting  the concerns of a librarian at the University of Technology in 
Sydney). 
39 See Asher Moses, Children’s Welfare Groups Slam Net Filters, THE AGE 
(Melbourne), Dec. 1, 2008, http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2008/11/28 
/1227491813497.html?page=fullpage (quoting a member of Save the Children as 
saying that educating kids and parents was the way to empower young people to 
be safe internet users). 
40 Australia to Implement Mandatory Internet Censorship, HERALD SUN, Oct. 29, 
2008, http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/mandatory-censorship-on-web 
/story-0-1111117883306. 
41 See Nate Anderson, Australia’s Internet Filter: Could Legal Content Be Banned, 
Too?, ARS TECHNICA, Oct. 28, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post 
/20081028-australias-internet-filter-could-legal-content-be-banned-too.html (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2009) (discussing Family First’s role in influencing governmental 
Internet filtering); FAMILY FIRST, INTERNET PORNOGRAPHY AND CHILDREN 1 (2008),  
http://www.familyfirst.org.au/documents/INTERNETPORNOGRAPHYANDC
HILDREN.pdf (advocating a “Mandatory Filtering Scheme at the ISP Server 
level”). 
42 Fran Foo & Andrew Colley, ISPs’ Co-Operation Crucial to Federal Blocks on 
Child Pornography, THE AUSTRALIAN, July 29, 2008, at 27 (quoting Child Wise chief 
executive Bernadette McMenamin). 
43 Id.  See also Fran Foo, Net Porn Filter Plan Needs Facelift, AUSTRALIAN IT, Jan. 
8, 2008, http://www.australianit.news.com.au/story/ 
0,24897,23021650-16123,00.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2009) (noting opposition by 
Telstra BigPond, Australia’s largest ISP). 
44 Asher Moses, Labor Plan to Censor Internet in Shreds, THE AGE, Dec. 9, 2008, 
available at http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2008/12/09/1228584820006 
.html. 
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before implementation.45  The government has suggested that it 
may be flexible in its approach to filtering in some cases, such as 
with mobile phones, by requiring them to meet established 
standards while allowing the providers to use the technology of 
their choice.46 
Recently, political prospects for legislation implementing 
filtering have worsened.  Independent Senator Nick Xenophon, 
who initially indicated that he might support filtering (particularly 
if it included gambling sites), stated that he now opposes the plan 
as potentially counter-productive and a waste of funds.47  
Ironically, the communications spokesperson for the opposition 
Liberal Party, Nick Minchin, argues that legislation is required for 
mandatory filtering.48  The opposition may be attempting to 
forestall governmental efforts to implement filtering through other 
means, such as public-private agreements similar to the one 
employed in the U.K.49  While awaiting results from the large-scale 
trial of filtering in 2009, the Labor government appeared to retreat 
from its initial position on mandatory filtering, or at least to 
indicate greater flexibility.  First, Minister Conroy stated that the 
mandatory blacklist of blocked sites would include only material 
classified Refused Classified (“RC”), rather than incorporating X –
rated and 18-and-over (“R18”) content.50  Second, Conroy 
suggested filtering could take place through a voluntary ISP 
 
45 See, e.g., Ben Grubb, ACS Gives Conditional Thumbs Up to Internet Filtering, 
IT NEWS AUSTRALIA., Oct. 12, 2009, http://www.itnews.com.au/News/158006,acs 
-gives-conditional-thumbs-up-to-internet-filtering.aspx (last visited Dec. 5, 2009) 
(reporting ACS support for filtering if five listed conditions are met by the federal 
government, including a specifically defined purpose of filtering). 
46 Andrew Colley, Filtering standards to be eased for mobiles, THE AUSTRALIAN, 
Sept. 30, 2008, at 30. 
47 Asher Moses, Web censorship plan heads towards a dead end, BRISBANE TIMES, 
Feb. 26, 2009, http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/news/technology/web              
-censorship-plan-heads-towards-a-dead-end/2009/02/26/1235237821636.html 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2009). 
48 Id. 
49 See generally Frank Fisher, Caught in the web, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 17, 2008, 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jan/17 
/caughtintheweb (discussing internet censorship by the Australian government). 
50 Conroy clarifies Net filter plans, WORLD NEWS AUSTL., Mar. 31, 2009, 
http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/1013745/Conroy-clarifies-Net-filter-plans 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2009). 
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industry code to ban content, rather than through legislation.51  
ISPs already operate under voluntary codes addressing issues such 
as spam and online gambling, but it is not clear whether providers 
would voluntarily adopt content restrictions.52  Australia’s 
proposed Internet censorship produces a political conundrum:  
filtering was a key plank in Labor’s electoral platform, but the 
government’s efforts to implement (and expand) it have generated 
substantial opposition. 
3. LEGAL CONTEXT 
Australia regulates content through a classification system that 
divides material into prohibited, restricted, and generally available 
zones.  Two specialized agencies, the ACMA and Classification 
Board, implement the statutory classification framework.  This 
system has its oddities—the same material may be treated more 
harshly online than offline, and material hosted in Australia 
receives more careful review than content hosted abroad—but is 
generally familiar to and accepted by Australian citizens.  
However, the Labor government’s proposal for generating block 
lists appears in tension with the complaint-based classification 
scheme used for Internet sites. 
Australia’s information regulation begins from an unusual 
point:  the country’s constitution contains no express guarantee of 
freedom of speech or expression53 (though the High Court has 
found there is an implied right to political communication).54  
 
51 Andrew Colley, Net Filtering May Not Be Mandatory, AUSTRALIAN IT, May 
26, 2009, http://www.australianit.news.com.au/story/0,27574,25542310-15306 
,00.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2009). 
52 See ACMA, Internet Codes Index, http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB 
/STANDARD/pc=IND_REG_CODES_INT (last visited Nov. 12, 2009) (provides 
access to a current list of “codes of practice” ISPs operate under based on 
legislation). 
53 See COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTION ACT; Frederick Schauer, 
On the Migration of Constitutional Ideas, 37 CONN. L. REV. 907, 918 (2005) (noting 
that the Australian constitution does not contain a Bill of Rights).  See generally 
EVAN CROEN, OPENNET INITIATIVE, AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND (May 15, 2007), 
http://opennet.net/research/regions/au-nz (“Without any explicit protection of 
free speech in the constitution, the Australian government has used its 
‘communications power’ delineated in the constitution to regulate the availability 
of offensive content, endowing a government entity with the power to issue take-
down notices for Internet content hosted within the country.”). 
54 See, e.g., Levy v. Victoria (1997) 189 C.L.R 579 (holding that the implied 
constitutional freedom of political speech is not absolute since laws that may 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss2/4
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Information restrictions, or protections, thus derive primarily from 
the democratic political process rather than ex ante structural rules.  
This gives Australia’s government greater leeway to censor 
Internet materials than would be possible in countries such as the 
United States, with its First Amendment, or Canada.55  Filtering 
thus faces less judicial scrutiny, and Australia’s constitution creates 
less need for the government to justify and tailor censorship than 
in other Western democracies. 
Australia currently handles objectionable Internet content at 
the federal level via a complaint and takedown system under the 
Broadcasting Services Amendment (Online Services) Act of 1999.56  
The ACMA responds to complaints from Australian users,57 and 
can initiate investigations on its own, by investigating whether 
Internet material qualifies as “prohibited content”.58  Prohibited 
content constitutes material that is classified59 as X18 (non-violent, 
sexually explicit activity between consenting adults), R18 (likely to 
disturb or harm minors), RC (refused classification), and, in some 
cases, MA15+.60  To categorize material hosted in Australia, the 
 
restrict political communication are valid if they are meant to achieve a legitimate 
purpose). 
55 See Paula Baron, The Moebius Strip: Private Right and Public Use in Copyright 
Law, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1227, 1252 (2007) (discussing how “the lack of a free speech 
guarantee” can affect public access to information, such as the Internet). 
56 Broadcasting Services Amendment (Online Services) Act 1999, No. 90 
(amending Broadcasting Services Act, No. 110 (1992) (Austl.)) (Austl.).  See 
generally Christopher Stevenson, Note, Breaching the Great Firewall: China’s Internet 
Censorship and the Quest for Freedom of Expression in a Connected World, 30 B.C. INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV. 531, 535 (2007) (discussing Australia’s Internet censorship method 
of relying on reports by the public to identify prohibited online content and 
classify it). 
57 See Broadcasting Services Act, No. 110, §§ 147, 149 (1992) (Austl.); ACMA, 
Prohibited Online Content, http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD/pc 
=PC_90102 (last visited Nov. 8, 2009) (providing a checklist for filing a complaint, 
such as being an Australian resident, knowing the Internet address, and having 
reasons to believe the online content is prohibited). 
58 See generally ACMA, Online Regulation, http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB 
/STANDARD/pc=PC_90169 (last visited Nov. 8, 2009) 
59 See NATIONAL CLASSIFICATION CODE, FED. REG. OF LEGIS. INSTRUMENTS 
F2005L00816 (Austl.), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw 
/Legislation/LegislativeInstrument1.nsf/0/B0644DBE6C7780F8CA256FD6001312
BE/$file/National+Classification+Code+for+tabling+and+registratio.pdf 
(describing films, documentaries, and publications that are classified under each 
category). 
60 ACMA, supra note 57. 
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ACMA relies upon the Classification Board,61 which applies the 
National Classification Code62 and the Guidelines for the 
Classification of Films and Computer Games63 developed under 
the Commonwealth Classification (Publications, Films, and 
Computer Games) Act of 1995.64  Classification Board decisions can 
be appealed to the Classification Review Board.65  If the material is 
hosted outside Australia, the ACMA estimates how the 
Classification Board would categorize the material, but does not 
submit the content to the Board.66  Oddly, the classification scheme 
treats Internet material like films,67 even if it is identical to content 
published in print offline, potentially leading to disparate 
treatment for the same information depending upon its medium.68  
More disturbingly, decisions by the Classification Board or the 
 
61 See Classification Board, The Classification Website, http://www 
.classification.gov.au/www/cob/classification.nsf/Page/Classification_in_Austr
aliaWho_we_areClassification_Board (last visited Nov. 8, 2009); The Classification 
Website, Classification Review Board, http://www.classification.gov.au/www 
/cob/classification.nsf/Page/Classification_in_AustraliaWho_we_areReview  
_Board (last visited Nov. 8, 2009). 
62 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
63 Guidelines for the Classification of Films and Computer Games, FED. REG. 
OF LEGIS. INSTRUMENTS F2008C00126 (Austl.), available at http://www.comlaw.gov 
.au/ComLaw/Legislation/LegislativeInstrumentCompilation1.nsf/0/F0EC030A1
08C93DDCA2574120004F6B8/$file/FCGGuidelines2005.pdf (explaining the 
criteria for classifying publications and films under the 1995 amendment in user-
friendly language). 
64 Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act, 1995, No. 7 
(1995) (Austl.) (setting out the requirements for the application and review of 
classifying media content). 
65 The Classification Review Board,  http://www.classification.gov.au/www 
/cob/classification.nsf/Page/ClassificationinAustralia_Whoweare_ReviewBoard
_ReviewBoard (last visited Oct. 26, 2009) 
66 ACMA, What Will ACMA Do?, http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB 
/STANDARD/pc=PC_310147#whatwill (last visited Dec. 4, 2009) (describing the 
steps ACMA will take if content is prohibited or not hosted in Australia). 
67 See Classification (Publications, Films, and Computer Games) Act 1995 § 5 
(defining “film” to include “any other form of recording from which a visual 
image, including a computer generated image, can be produced”). 
68 See Australian Government, Attorney-General’s Department, Classification 
Categories and Markings, http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page 
/Classificationpolicy_Classificationcategoriesandmarkings (last visited Oct. 26, 
2009) (comparing classification schemes for films, Internet material and 
publications). 
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ACMA on Internet material are secret, unlike decisions on offline 
content.69 
If the Classification Board finds that the website constitutes 
prohibited content, the ACMA sends a takedown notice to the ISP 
or Internet Content Host.70  If the ACMA believes material 
constitutes prohibited content, or may constitute prohibited 
content, but is not hosted in Australia, the ACMA notifies Web 
blocking software vendors to add the site to their block lists.71  The 
ACMA maintains a “black list” of roughly 1100 sites that should be 
blocked by these vendors.72  While the Rudd government has 
implied that these sites are almost entirely composed of child 
pornography, approximately 49% of the list’s sites were child 
pornography, 63% were RC content, and 32% were X18+ 
material.73  One site on the black list, for example, is an anti-
abortion website, whose pictures of aborted fetuses led to its 
categorization as RC.74  An ACMA spokesperson, testifying before 
a parliamentary committee, stated that the Authority would seek 
to block content classified as RC, X18+, or R18+ that is not 
protected by an age verification system.75  ACMA’s blacklist thus 
includes material, such as R18+ content, that is lawful for adults to 
view and possess. 
This legal mechanism has been employed to generate, through 
the combination of complaints, investigations, and classification, 
the blacklist of sites compiled by the ACMA.  Whether ISPs will be 
required to block only these sites, or must also filter additional 
material, is both unclear and contested.  Political representatives 
 
69 Electronic Frontiers Australia, FOI Request on ABA, http://www.efa.org 
.au/FOI/foi_aba_2000.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2009) (discussing the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal decision to black out URLs on documents before 
releasing them to Electronic Frontiers Australia). 
70 ACMA, Regulating Online Content, http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB 
/STANDARD/pc=INT_IND_CONTENT_ABOUT (last visited Dec. 4, 2009). 
71 Id. (stating that ACMA will notify suppliers of approved filters if the 
content is not hosted in Australia, but is likely prohibited). 
72 Fran Foo, Row Over Web blacklist, AUSTRALIAN IT, Feb. 24, 2009, http:// 
www.australianit.news.com.au/story/0,24897,25096792-15318,00.html (quoting 
ACMA figure of 1090 sites as of January 31, 2009). 
73 Id. (quoting November 30, 2008 figures which involved 1370 pages, 
including 864 RC content links, 674 child pornography links, and 441 X18+ links). 
The total exceeds 100% as a site may be both child pornography and RC. 
74 Id. 
75 John Ozimek, Aussie Internet-Net Will Be Drawn Wider, THE REGISTER, Feb. 
25, 2009, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/02/25/oz_internet_net/. 
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such as Senator Fielding have argued for expanding filtering to 
additional classification categories such as R18+,76 though the 
government has shifted its stance on what material should be 
placed on the mandatory blacklist.77 
Australia’s states and territories also have an admixture of 
Internet content regulatory laws.  Some have laws stricter than the 
federal scheme (such as Victoria), some have information-
restricting laws that do not cover online material (such as 
Tasmania), and some have regulations that are more stringent in 
some respects and more lax in others compared to federal law 
(such as Western Australia).78 
An additional issue that may be legally problematic is Labor’s 
proposal to incorporate lists of child pornography from other 
sources—particularly Britain’s Internet Watch Foundation 
(“IWF”)79—into the list of sites that must be blocked80.  This idea 
generates two problems.  First, it flies in the face of the complaint-
based model used to determine what Internet content is 
prohibited.81  Incorporating other block lists into filtering 
effectively shifts, or outsources, responsibility for classification 
from the ACMA and the Classification Board to foreign third 
parties with no responsibility to, or accountability in, Australia.  
While the ACMA might treat foreign block lists as complaints and 
vet the sites on them for illegality, this practice may contravene 
 
76 Nate Anderson, Australia’s Internet Filter: Could Legal Content Be Banned, 
Too?, ARS TECHNICA, Oct. 28, 2008,  http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post 
/20081028-australias-internet-filter-could-legal-content-be-banned-too.html. 
77 See, e.g., Asher Moses, Christians Upset at Conroy’s Net Policy “Backtrack,” 
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, May 27, 2009, available at http://www.smh.com.au 
/news/technology/web/christians-upset-at-conroys-net-policy-backtrack/2009 
/05/27/1243103585180.html (discussing the debate around whether the 
government should soften its policy to censor Internet content). 
78 See Electronic Frontiers Australia, Internet Censorship Laws in Australia (Mar. 
31, 2006), http://www.efa.org.au/Issues/Censor/cens1.html#sandt (outlining 
the different types of legislation enacted by States and Territories that enable 
prosecution of Internet users that make available or download child 
pornography). 
79 Internet Watch Foundation, http://www.iwf.org.uk (last visited Dec. 11, 
2008) 
80 Moses, supra note 44. 
81 The ACMA has begun researching this issue.  Testimony of Nerida 
O’Loughlin before the Standing Committee on Environment, Communication, and the 
Arts 65–66 (2009), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate 
/committee/S11635.pdf. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss2/4
2009] FILTERING IN OZ 507 
 
Australian law by treating foreign complainants as equal with 
Australian ones.82 
Second, while child pornography might seem amenable to a 
universal definition, this is not empirically true.  Graphic sexual 
cartoons of Bart and Lisa Simpson (from the television program 
“The Simpsons”) likely would not qualify as child pornography in 
the United States,83 but might in Australia.84  Similarly, both 
Australia and the U.S. ban the possession of nude images of 16-
year-olds, but Japan does not.85  The IWF classified the cover of a 
music album from 1976 (which featured a picture of a nude girl) as 
child pornography, and then reversed itself.86  Including foreign 
lists of child pornography into Australia’s block list undercuts the 
country’s ability to render its own, sovereign judgments about 
what material is unlawful and transfers authority for such 
decisions to unaccountable third parties who may use different 
standards. 
Overall, Australia’s scheme for classifying Internet content — 
in particular its federal system with the Classification Board and 
the ACMA—sets out the legal backdrop for decisions on what 
material to filter.  While Australia’s system for content ratings and 
restrictions is well-established, its application to the Internet in the 
context of filtering is proving controversial. 
 
 
82 See generally AMCA, supra note 57 (requiring that a complainant be an 
Australian or a company based in Australia). 
83 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (ruling that virtual child 
pornography is protected under the First Amendment).  But see United States v. 
Whorley, 550 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 2008) (upholding a conviction for the violation of a 
statute prohibiting the act of knowingly receiving obscene material). 
84 McEwen v. Simmons & Anor (2008) N.S.W.S. Ct. R. 1292; see generally 
Bellinda Kontominas, Simpsons Cartoon Rip-off is Child Corn—Judge, SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD, Dec. 8. 2008, available at http://www.stuff.co.nz/4786351a1860 
.html (explaining the ruling of an Australian Supreme Court judge who ruled that 
an Internet cartoon in which characters from The Simpsons engage in sexual acts is 
child pornography). 
85 See Jake Adelstein, This Mob Is Big in Japan, WASH. POST, May 11, 2008, at B2 
(noting Japan does not criminalize possession of child pornography, though it 
does ban distribution and production). 
86 IWF Backs Down on Wiki Censorship, BBC NEWS, Dec. 9, 2008, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7774102.stm. The offending image is 
available from Wikipedia, Virgin Killer, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/Virgin_Killer. 
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4. TECHNOLOGICAL CONTEXT 
Australia is trying to adapt filtering practices to its 
decentralized network architecture.  To refine implementation, the 
Labor government launched an initial pilot on one ISP, and is 
beginning a larger-scale trial.  The proposed system has two levels: 
a mandatory block of at least the ACMA block list and an “opt-
out” layer that filters material inappropriate for children but 
permissible for adults.87  Initial testing shows that filtering faces 
several challenges.  First, the government has been ambiguous 
about the scope of targeted content.  Second, blocking inevitably 
restricts both too much and too little content, even when there is 
consensus on what should be filtered.  Finally, there is a collateral 
cost to filtering:  adverse performance effects and reduced Internet 
access speeds.  The “tax” in access speed and added cost that 
filtering imposes creates tension between Australia’s efforts to 
censor the Internet and its goal of expanding broadband access.88 
From a technological perspective, Australia offers a fascinating 
test case:  the country seeks to retrofit Internet filtering to a 
network infrastructure that did not contemplate this need as a 
design goal.89  Authoritarian countries have often built their 
network infrastructures with information control as an express 
requirement:  Saudi Arabia created an architecture where Internet 
traffic flows through three “choke points” overseen by the 
Communications and Internet Technology Commission, allowing 
filtering to occur at three centralized locations.90  Similarly, China 
deployed its networks to allow censorship to occur at multiple 
control points, from international gateways to the network 
backbone to regional network providers.91 
 
87 See, e.g., Foo, supra note 14 (reporting the timeline for ISP filtering trials). 
88 See AUSTRALIAN COMPUTER SOCIETY, TECHNICAL OBSERVATIONS ON ISP BASED 
FILTERING OF THE INTERNET 3, 12–15 (Oct. 2009), https://www.acs.org.au                        
/attachments/2009/ispfilteringoct09.pdf (describing the complexity inherent in 
the development of Australia’s Internet filtering system). 
89 See Croen, supra note 533 (providing an overview of both the Australian 
and New Zealand approach to filtering Internet content). 
90 See Content Filtering in Saudi Arabia, http://www.internet.gov.sa/learn    
-the-web/guides/content-filtering-in-saudi-arabia (last visited Dec. 6, 2009). 
91 See ETHAN GUTMANN, LOSING THE NEW CHINA: A STORY OF AMERICAN 
COMMERCE, DESIRE, AND BETRAYAL 127–32 (2004) (explaining Chinese motivation 
for and approach to control over Internet architecture); JONATHAN L. ZITTRAIN & 
JOHN G. PALFREY, JR., INTERNET FILTERING IN CHINA IN 2004–2005: A COUNTRY STUDY 
48–49 (Apr. 2005), http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_China 
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Australia’s Internet deployment, in contrast, was driven by 
user demand for access to the Web and emerged in a more free-
form, market driven fashion, rather than following a centralized 
plan or model.92  Thus, Australia lacks a single nexus—or even a 
small number of network nodes—where filtering can be deployed 
to achieve complete coverage.  ISPs must necessarily be involved in 
censorship if it is to be mandatory and universal.  (How this 
distributed model compares to centralized filtering in terms of 
performance and effects on network speeds is not certain; filtering 
could be faster if its workload were distributed by being placed 
closer to the network edge or faster if placed closer to the core 
where it could achieve efficiencies of scale and avoid redundancy.) 
93  It can also increase the challenge of keeping block lists up to 
date; as there are more network points where the lists are 
implemented, it becomes more challenging to ensure each list is 
properly updated.  The outcome of Australia’s experiment with 
applying mandatory filtering in the decentralized environment of a 
Western democratic nation will have much to teach other countries 
considering similar systems. 
The current Labor filtering plan contemplates a two-tiered 
system.  The first level would block access to ACMA’s blacklist.  
This filter would be mandatory for all users.  The second level 
would block material categorized as inappropriate for children, 
such as pornography and violence, and could be bypassed by users 
on request (an opt-out system).94  The government has not 
specified clearly what types of material would be censored by 
either tier of filtering, though it appears to have moved towards 
mandating the blocking of only RC material.95 
 
_Country_Study.pdf (reporting research results that reflect China’s multi-tiered 
approach to control of information online). 
92 See Roger Clarke’s Website, Origins and Nature of the Internet in Australia: 
The Beginnings of the Australian Internet, http://www.rogerclarke.com/II 
/oz104.htmlo#beg (last visited Oct. 27, 2009) (mapping the rise of the Australian 
Internet connectivity from a university-centered system to a national network). 
93 See AUSTRALIAN COMPUTER SOCIETY, supra note 88, at 12 (outlining the 
numerous considerations presented by the decision of where to filter within an 
ISP network). 
94 See, e.g., Nick Bryant, Australia Trials National Net Filters, BBC NEWS, Oct. 
25, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7689964.stm (presenting 
Australian politician Stephen Conroy’s explanation of the filtering project in 
contrast with the popular reaction that it has provoked). 
95 See AUSTRALIAN COMPUTER SOCIETY, supra note 88, at 3 (“[R]ecent 
Government statements indicate that ISP level filtering will apply to RC material 
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No filtering system is impermeable, however.  Technologically-
adept users have already begun to test—and share—methods to 
circumvent filtering once it is implemented.  The range of 
circumvention methods is broad,96 and includes tactics such as 
requesting Web pages through a proxy server,97 using encryption, 
and employing alternative network paths through services such as 
Tor, also known as “the onion router,” which enhances Internet 
privacy by bypassing traffic analysis.98  While the government 
optimistically regards the risk of circumvention as low,99 
technically skilled users have long bypassed filtering in 
sophisticated systems such as those of China100 and Iran.101 
 
that is on the ACMA blacklist, [but] there is still a considerable amount of 
confusion amongst the ICT sector on exactly what content will be filtered.”). 
96 See generally Nart Villeneuve, Choosing Circumvention: Technical Ways To Get 
Round Censorship, in REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, HANDBOOK FOR BLOGGERS AND 
CYBER-DISSIDENTS 63 (2005), http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/handbook 
_bloggers_cyberdissidents-GB.pdf (providing insight into the various forms of 
“circumvention technologies” that allow people to avoid online censorship and 
surveillance efforts). 
97 See, e.g., Contempt by Paul Dwerryhouse, How to Bypass Australia’s 
Forthcoming Internet Filter, http://weblog.leapster.org/archives/122-How-to             
-bypass-Australias-forthcoming-internet-filter.html (Nov. 13, 2008, 18:17) 
(describing use of SSH as a SOCKS proxy to a remote server). 
98 See Tor: Overview, http://www.torproject.org/overview.html.en (last 
modified March 3, 2009) (explaining how the system enhances privacy by keeping 
users anonymous through distribution of transaction points, and also giving 
examples of how people use the system to access Internet services and 
communicate with others). 
99 AUSTRALIAN COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA AUTHORITY, supra note 8, at 9 
(assessing the relative levels of probability that various forms of Internet filtration 
will be circumvented). 
100 See, e.g., Sumner Lemon, Group Offers Tools to Evade China’s Web Censorship, 
PC WORLD, Aug. 4, 2008, http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article 
/149341/group_offers_tools_to_evade_chinas_web_censorship.html (reporting 
on the availability of software that allows reporters in China to circumvent online 
government filters). 
101 See, e.g., THE CITIZEN LAB, University of Toronto, EVERYONE’S GUIDE TO BY-
PASSING INTERNET CENSORSHIP 16 (Sept. 2007), http://citizenlab.org/CL-circGuide 
-online.pdf (offering one example of an activist “tunneling” past Chinese Internet 
firewalls in order to post otherwise censored information); Nart Villeneuve, 
Evasion Tactics, 36 INDEX ON CENSORSHIP 71, 75 (Nov. 2007), available at 
http://www.nartv.org/mirror/evasiontactics-indexoncensorship.pdf 
(referencing a widespread Iranian practice of dodging Internet filters in order to 
follow the writings of bloggers). 
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To evaluate potential filtering methods and to answer critics, 
the Rudd government launched a first-stage pilot program.102  The 
trial evaluated six filtering products in effects on network 
performance, effectiveness in blocking access to prohibited sites, 
and inadvertent blocking of permitted sites.  The trial, run by Enex 
TestLab, took place on the network of the ISP Telstra in 
Tasmania.103  Telstra did not participate in the test’s 
implementation other than by providing network access, and had 
no specific knowledge of its methodology or results.104 
The pilot evaluated the products’ effectiveness by testing three 
lists of URLs that were vetted by the ACMA.105  The first list 
(Category 1) contained 1000 URLs categorized as prohibited 
content.  The second list (Category 2) contained 933 URLs that, 
while not illegal, might be inappropriate for minors.  The third list 
(Category 3) contained 1997 URLs that were permissible for 
minors.  The trial evaluated under-breadth—failure to block 
prohibited material—by measuring the percentage of sites in 
Categories 1 and 2 that a product filtered.106  (Here, a perfect score 
would be 0%.)107  It measured over-breadth—filtering of sites 
without illicit content—by measuring the percentage of sites in 
Category 3 that a product blocked.108  (Perfection would be 0%.)  
Results varied greatly:  under-breadth ranged from a low of 2% to 
a high of 13% across the six products; over-breadth ranged from a 
low of 1.3% to a high of 7.8%.109  Filtering products that blocked 
more banned sites also tended to block more innocent ones.110 
 
102 See generally Liam Tung, BitTorrent hole in ISP filter tests, ZDNET AUSTL., 
July 18, 2008, http://www.zdnet.com.au/news/communications/soa/BitTorrent 
-hole-in-ISP-filter-tests/0,130061791,339290888,00.htm (reporting on the federal 
government’s release of the results of ISP-level content filtering tests). 
103 AUSTRALIAN COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA AUTHORITY, supra note 8, at 17–
18, 22. 
104 Id.  
105 Id. at 20–22. 
106 Id. at 35, 37. 
107 Zero under-breadth would mean that the difference between the total sites 
tested in Categories 1 and 2 and the total sites blocked divided by the total sites 
tested in Categories 1 and 2 equals zero. 
108  AUSTRALIAN COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA AUTHORITY, supra note 8, at 35, 
37. 
109 Id. at 62–68. 
110 See discussion of these results infra Section 5.2. 
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The test also demonstrated that all but one product had a 
significant, detrimental effect on network performance (the 
amount of data per unit time that the network could transport).  
Enex TestLab measured three data points (all calculated as the 
number of transactions per second the network could support): a 
baseline; the decrease in performance when the filtering product 
was installed but not blocking content (“passive”); and the 
decrease in performance when the filtering product blocked 
material (“active”).111 
As with effectiveness, performance impact varied.  Of the six 
tested products, five reduced performance in passive mode by 8% 
or less (one incurred a performance hit of 22%).112  When switched 
into active mode, though, five products reduced performance by 
20% or more (one maintained 98% performance).113  The worst 
product throttled network speed to 16% of the baseline measure.114  
ISPs may incur significant performance penalties when filtering, 
though the effect depends greatly upon the product that they use.  
Minister Conroy has dismissed performance concerns, noting that 
the “internet hasn’t ground to a halt in the UK, [and] it hasn’t 
ground to a halt in Scandinavian countries.”115 
 
Filtering Product Passive Performance 
(baseline = 100) 
Active Performance 
(baseline = 100) 
Alpha 92 16 
Beta 99 67 
Gamma 98 14 
Delta 99 98 
Theta 78 76 
Omega 101 79 
 
 
111  AUSTRALIAN COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA AUTHORITY, supra note 8, at 34. 
112 Id. at 62–68. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 60 (describing the filtering product Alpha). 
115 Conroy Announces Mandatory Internet Filters to Protect Children, AUSTL. 
BROAD. CORP. NEWS, Dec. 31, 2007, http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007 
/12/31/2129471.htm [hereinafter Mandatory Internet Filters] 
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TABLE 1 - PERFORMANCE EFFECTS IN FILTERING TRIAL116 
In late 2008, the government released technical specifications 
for a second, broader filtering trial.117  The second pilot invited ISPs 
at all industry levels to participate—though a number of 
prominent providers have refused118—and to select from a range of 
filtering options, from blocking only the ACMA’s blacklist to more 
broadly targeting sensitive content.119  ISPs were encouraged to 
enroll customers voluntarily in the trial.120  Testing will be 
conducted for a range of network bandwidths (from 56 Kbps to 12 
Mbps) and physical media;121 commentators have criticized the 
limited bandwidth as likely to distort results.122 
The second test expands upon the initial Tasmanian pilot in 
several key respects.  It includes more ISPs,123 envisions blocking 
an ACMA-mandated list of up to 10,000 URLs (including lists of 
child pornography from other sources, such as Britain’s Internet 
Watch Foundation),124 and tests different technical variants of 
 
116  AUSTRALIAN COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA AUTHORITY, supra note 8, app. f 
at 62–68. 
117 DEP’T OF BROADBAND, COMMC’NS AND THE DIGITAL ECON., INTERNET SERVICE 
PROVIDER CONTENT FILTERING PILOT: TECHNICAL TESTING FRAMEWORK 1 (2008), 
available at http://www.dbcde.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/89160 
/technical-testing-framework.pdf 
118 See, e.g., Fran Foo, Telstra says no to filtering trials, AUSTL. IT, Dec. 9, 2008, 
http://www.australianit.news.com.au/story/0,24897,24771009-15306,00.html 
(reporting that Telstra and Internode, two of Australia’s largest ISPs, both 
declined to participate in content filtering trials). 
119 DEP’T OF BROADBAND, COMMC’NS AND THE DIGITAL ECON., supra note 117, at 
2; Moses, supra note 44; see also Foo, supra note 14 (noting TECH 2U will let 
participating customers designate additional content categories for blocking). 
120 Foo, supra note 14. 
121 DEP’T OF BROADBAND, COMMC’NS AND THE DIGITAL ECON., supra note 117, at 
8. 
122 See, e.g., Darren Pauli, Optus, iiNet Put Filters to the Test, COMPUTERWORLD, 
Nov. 13, 2008, http://www.computerworld.com.au/article/267223/optus_iinet 
_put_filters_test (reporting that trials restricted to 12 Mbps will undermine final 
test results since they are only a “small fraction of ISP network connections”). 
123 The government received applications from sixteen ISPs and initially 
selected six.  Foo, supra note 14.  Some ISPs, such as iiNet, sought to participate to 
demonstrate “how stupid it is.”  Asher Moses, Net censorship plan backlash, THE 
AGE (Melbourne), Nov. 11, 2008, http://www.theage.com.au/news/technology 
/biztech/net-censorship-plan-backlash/2008/11/11/1226318639085.html?page 
=fullpage#contentSwap1 (quoting iiNet managing director Michael Malone who 
was participating in the trials to give hard data that the system would not work). 
124 DEP’T OF BROADBAND, COMMC’NS AND THE DIGITAL ECON., supra note 117, at 
4; Moses, supra note 44.  But see IWF backs down on Wiki censorship, supra note 86 
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filtering (such as blocking IP addresses versus URLs, or altering 
Domain Name Service results).125  The test also considers 
additional variables that will affect implementing filtering, such as 
ease of circumventing blocking, cost, ease of use, effectiveness at 
blocking non-Web content, and scalability.126  Interestingly, the 
trial’s framework contemplates using a user complaint system not 
only to determine sites to block (which the ACMA already does), 
but also to reduce over-blocking by identifying sites that are 
inadvertently filtered.127  This next phase of testing provides 
further data to guide implementation of the Labor government’s 
filtering program. 
The Tasmanian (first) trial run of filtering has not assuaged 
critics of the government’s plan, and demonstrates that censorship 
incurs information costs as well as financial and technological 
ones.  The information costs are threefold.  First, users will 
inevitably be unable to access permitted sites due to inadvertent 
over-blocking.128  Second, either their connection speed will slow 
due to the network latency introduced by filtering, or users will 
have to pay more for the same speed of Internet access.  Third, 
filtering cannot now prevent access to much illicit content online.  
Currently, most filtering products offer only crude, all-or-nothing 
capabilities for content communicated over e-mail, peer-to-peer file 
sharing, instant messaging, and other protocols, either blocking 
them completely or letting their traffic pass unfettered.  The 
filtering programs tested by Australia all censor Web-based 
material (“HTTP”), but only five claim to block secure Web traffic 
(“HTTPS”), two claim to filter e-mail content, and one claims to 
filter streaming video.129  This means that filtering can prevent 
casual or easy access to banned material, but is less successful in 
 
(reporting Internet Watch Foundation’s withdrawal of its objection to a Wikipedia 
page containing suspected child pornography). 
125 DEP’T OF BROADBAND, COMMC’NS AND THE DIGITAL ECON., supra note 117, at 
3. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 5. 
128 Cf. INTERNET FILTERING IN SAUDI ARABIA IN 2004, http://opennet.net 
/studies/saudi#toc1d (last visited Dec. 3, 2009) (describing inadvertent blocking 
in Saudi Arabia due to classification errors). 
129  AUSTRALIAN COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA AUTHORITY, supra note 8, at 44–
45. 
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disrupting determined attempts to share it.130  Child pornography, 
for example, is increasingly shared over peer-to-peer networks 
rather than the Web.131  This implies that filtering can reduce access 
to child pornography, and similar unlawful material, but cannot 
eliminate it.132  These costs are real and must be weighed against 
the benefits filtering achieves. 
Moreover, these challenges create implicit tensions in 
Australia’s larger Internet policy agenda.  If the pilot filtering 
program results are accurate, implementing censorship will reduce 
Internet access speeds—perhaps significantly.  This could undercut 
Australia’s efforts to drive broadband deployment.133  Filtering 
could effectively reduce broadband to lower-bandwidth access.  
For example, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development defines “broadband” as having a minimum access 
speed of 256 kilobits per second (“kbps”).134  A 20% reduction in 
speed would drop such a connection to 205 kbps, and a 75% 
reduction would drop it to 64 kbps—barely faster than dial-up 
access.135  Filtering acts as a tax:  customers not only pay censorship 
costs directly (through levies passed on by ISPs), but indirectly, as 
ISPs will need to account and charge for, the bandwidth overhead 
of filtering when offering access at various speeds.  Similarly, ISPs 
 
130 See generally AUSTL. COMPUTER SOC’Y, supra note 88, at 5 (exploring the best 
approaches to ISP filtering while recognizing there are many ways to circumvent 
these efforts). 
131 See generally Stumbling onto Smut: The Alarming Ease of Access to 
Pornography on Peer-to-Peer Networks: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 
108th Cong. 27–48 (2003) (statement of Linda D. Koontz, Director, Information 
Management Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office) (providing data that child 
pornography is easily found and downloaded from peer-to-peer networks); Press 
Release, Dep’t of Justice, Multi-Agency Investigation Targets Use of Peer-to-Peer 
Networks to Exchange Child Pornography (Aug. 19, 2008), available at 
http://losangeles.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel08/la081908usa.htm (discussing a 
multiple-agency effort to target those using peer-to-peer networks to exchange 
child pornography). 
132 See Moses, supra note 39 (quoting David Vale, Executive Director of 
UNSW’s Cyberspace Law and Policy Centre as saying, “[t]here seemed to be some 
consensus that the proposed mandatory filter model would not actually be 
directed at the real channel of child porn distribution, which is not the blacklist of 
known web sites, but via various other internet protocols and tools”). 
133 AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY, supra note 9, at 23–24.  
134 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD BROADBAND SUBSCRIBER 
CRITERIA (2008), http://www.oecd.org/document/46/0,3343,en_2649_34225 
_39575598_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
135 Five of six products tested in the initial trial caused at least 20% decreases; 
two caused at least 75% drops. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
516 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:2 
 
will need to invest in additional network capacity, incurring costs.  
The ACMA estimates that a provider with a four-year upgrade 
cycle for its networking equipment would, when faced with a 25% 
performance decrease from filtering, be forced to move to a three-
year upgrade cycle.  Censorship’s cost—the filtering tax—is thus 
both technical (access speed) and financial (increased overhead and 
cost of equivalent access). 
Technologically, the Rudd government seeks to mandate that 
ISPs retrofit filtering to a heterogeneous network architecture 
designed to avoid network blockages of exactly the type that 
online censorship creates.  The cost, difficulty, and performance 
drop that the country’s Internet access suffers as a result of filtering 
will guide other nations that consider implementing broad, 
mandatory content restrictions online. 
5. ANALYSIS 
Internet censorship used to be limited to bad actors:  
authoritarian regimes such as China and Iran, or non-democratic 
countries with limited protections for civil liberties such as Saudi 
Arabia.  A country’s system of governance and protection for 
human rights could be used as a proxy for whether its online 
content restrictions were legitimate.  This simple analytical rule no 
longer works—Britain,136 Canada,137 France,138 Thailand,139 India,140 
 
136 See generally Fisher, supra note 4. 
137  See CYBERTIP!CA, CLEANFEED CANADA, http://cybertip.ca/app/en 
/cleanfeed (last visited Dec. 4, 2009) (stating Canada’s Cleanfeed system “aims to 
reduce accidental access to child sexual abuse images as well as to discourage 
those trying to access or distribute child pornography”). 
138 See France Blocks Online Child Porn, Terrorism, Racism, U.S.A. TODAY, June 
10, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/world/2008-06-10-france     
-online-porn_N.htm; Declan McCullagh, Google Excluding Controversial Sites, 
CNET NEWS.COM, Oct. 23, 2002,  http://www.news.com/2100-1023-963132.html 
(stating that Google has deleted controversial sites in France); SANGAMITRA 
RAMACHANDER, OPENNET INITIATIVE, EUROPE, http://opennet.net/research 
/regions/europe (last visited Dec. 4, 2009) (discussing suits brought against 
Google and Yahoo by French entities). 
139  See Posting of C.J. Hinke to Global Voices Advocacy, Censoring Free 
Speech in Thailand  (May 17, 2008), http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2008 
/05/17/censoring-free-speech-in-thailand. 
140  See OPENNET INITIATIVE, INDIA (2007), http://opennet.net/research 
/profiles/india (stating that the Department of Telecommunications announced 
that mechanisms would be installed to filter websites in India). 
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and Turkey141 all filter the Internet within a democratic 
framework.142  Thus, we need a more sophisticated way to judge 
whether Internet censorship is legitimate. 
In a recent article, I describe a new four-part methodology to 
assess the legitimacy of a country’s Internet filtering.143  The 
methodology employs a process-based approach to enable 
normative analysis that is separate from an observer’s perspective 
on which content may legitimately be targeted for censorship.  In 
other words, it seeks to enable you to assess whether a country’s 
blocking of pornography is legitimate regardless of whether you 
approve of filtering porn.  Briefly, the four-part framework 
evaluates a country’s filtering based on whether it is open (does the 
nation admit that it censors, and why?), transparent (does the 
country describe the material that it blocks and its criteria for 
classification?), narrow (does the filtering block proscribed 
material effectively and leave lawful material untouched?), and 
accountable (does the country respond to users’ desires regarding 
filtering, and are decisionmakers subject to challenge for erroneous 
choices?).  Legitimate filtering is open, transparent, narrowly 
focused, and accountable to citizens.  The paper proposes that 
different analysts and stakeholders should develop quantitative 
metrics to measure countries upon these four axes, with the 
resulting competition among the metrics driving refinement and 
improvement.  Since this iterative process has not yet taken place, 
the next section offers a preliminary assessment of Australia’s 
proposed filtering system based on these four criteria. 
5.1. Openness 
Australia is quite open about its filtering intentions.  The Labor 
Party included a proposal to censor Internet content in its official 
National Platform for the most recent federal election.144  Minister 
 
141  See Jeffrey Rosen, Google’s Gatekeepers, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 30, 2008, at 
50 (stating that “a Turkish judge had ordered the nation’s telecom providers to 
block access to the [YouTube] site in response to videos that insulted the founder 
of modern Turkey”); Yigal Schleifer, Turkey Tightens Controls on Internet Speech, 
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 30, 2008, available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/1030/p06s01-wome.html (discussing Turkey’s 
ban on 850 websites). 
142 See generally ACCESS DENIED, supra note 1. 
143 Bambauer, supra note 16, at 390–410. 
144 AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY, supra note9. 
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Conroy has given press statements,145 responded to questions in 
Parliament,146 and put forth position papers outlining the 
government’s intentions.147  While Labor’s cyber-safety plan 
emerged late in the electoral campaign, its content was similar to 
its earlier program from March 2006.  The controversy over the 
filtering plan emerged precisely because of the Labor government’s 
forthrightness on the subject. 
The government has also been open about its normative 
reasons for engaging in filtering.  The Labor Party’s cyber-safety 
plan focuses on potential threats to children, such as exposure to 
“harmful and inappropriate online material,” Internet sex 
predators and sex offenders, identity theft, and computer 
viruses.148  The rationale for restricting other types of content—
particularly that which would be lawful for Australians to view 
online normally or to access in offline media—is less clear, but 
builds upon the values and choices underlying the country’s 
overarching content regulation scheme.  This latter point is 
challenging to assess because the Labor government has not yet 
described what content, beyond that which is illegal, would be 
filtered, particularly by the opt-out layer of the system. 
However, if the government does move to include material 
beyond the ACMA blacklist, it should be clear about why it targets 
that material.  One rationale might be that the opt-out method for 
adults to view such sites functions as an effective age restriction on 
content similar to those used for movies.149  This should create 
 
145 See, e.g., Mandatory Internet Filters, supra note 115. 
146 Official Committee Hansard: Testimony Before the Sen. Standing Comm. on 
Env’t., Commc’ns., and the Arts 71-79 (2009) (Austl.) (statement of  Sen. Stephen 
Conroy, Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy), 
http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S11635.pdf [hereinafter 
Conroy Statement] 
147 CONROY, supra note 6. 
148 CONROY, supra note 6, at 2–7. 
149 Compare CLASSIFICATION BOARD, COMPLIANCE FOR CINEMAS AND OTHER 
PUBLIC EXHIBITORS, http://www.classification.gov.au/www/cob/classification 
.nsf/Page/Industry_HowtoComplywithClassificationLaws_ComplianceforCinem
asandOtherPublicExhibitors (last visited Dec. 4, 2009) (providing a guideline of 
compliance requirements), with ACMA, Minimum Verification System Requirements: 
Restricted Access Systems Declaration 1999 (source on file with U. PA. J. INT’L. L) 
(setting out the minimum system requirements for a “restricted access system”), 
and Gerard Goggin, Regulating Mobile Content: Convergences and Citizenship, 12 
INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 140, 149–52 (2008) (discussing mobile device content 
regulation). 
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added pressure, though, for the country to justify the disparate 
treatment of material online and offline. 
Overall, Australia is open about its filtering, and scores highly 
for this criterion. 
5.2. Transparency 
To date, Australia’s transparency regarding its filtering has 
been poor.  The country has vacillated on what material it will 
target for blocking.150  This uncertainty makes it difficult for 
citizens to assess whether the scope of material blocked is 
appropriate, and whether the set of targeted sites comports with 
the underlying rationales for censorship.  The Labor government is 
opaque about the types of sites that will be blocked, how a site will 
be evaluated for filtering, and how those decisions map to larger 
social and political goals. 
Transparency measures how clearly the government discloses 
what content it seeks to block and explains why that material runs 
counter to its goals.  By being transparent, a country lets citizens 
assess how the banned sites relate to the government’s broader 
rationales for censorship.  A country filtering the Internet to 
prevent harm to children could target pornography, extreme 
violence, or illegal drugs sites—or all three.  Transparency varies 
along a continuum, from disclosing the list of sites blocked (which 
Australia has refused to do) to describing vague guidelines for 
prohibited content.  A key feature of transparency is that it can be 
tested:  groups such as Reporters Without Borders151 and the 
OpenNet Initiative152 can challenge a government’s claims by 
checking what sites are blocked.  If the country claims only to block 
material harmful to youth, but censors the political opposition 
while failing to filter pornography, it is plainly not being 
transparent.153 
 
150 See Conroy Statement, supra note 146 (indicating much recent debate in 
Australia on the issue). 
151 See, e.g., REPORTERS WITHOUT BOREDERS: TUNISIA, http://www.rsf.org 
/article.php3?id_article=26158&Valider=OK (last visited Dec. 4, 2009) (providing 
an example of how Reporters Without Borders challenges governmental claims). 
152 See generally ACCESS DENIED, supra note 1 (explaining how the OpenNet 
Initiative challenges governmental claims). 
153 Vietnam, for example, claims to censor only pornography.  However, the 
country blocks zero pornographic sites, but does block a host of political ones.  See 
OPENNET INITIATIVE: VIETNAM, May 9, 2007, http://opennet.net/research 
/profiles/vietnam. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
520 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:2 
 
It is clear that the system will filter at least some illegal 
material, such as child pornography.154  The blacklist of sites 
compiled by the ACMA is sure to be blocked.  However, recently 
Minister Conroy outlined a plan to expand blocking to include 
“other unwanted content,” such as Internet gambling sites and 
material on euthanasia or encouraging eating disorders.155  The 
testing plan for the second phase of trials includes evaluations of a 
filtering product’s capability to prevent circumvention, which 
implies blocking sites (such as proxy servers and anonymizers) 
that enable bypassing restrictions.156  Yet the Labor government 
has not openly discussed banning this additional category of sites. 
The uncertainty in what material will be proscribed generates 
at least two transparency problems.  First, the government has yet 
to indicate even the categories of material that it will filter, let alone 
the criteria by which it will evaluate a site.  This makes it difficult 
for Australian citizens to decide whether the scope of the filtering 
system is appropriate, overly broad, or insufficient.  Minister 
Conroy’s statement about a block list of 10,000 sites suggests either 
that the government has a sense of the scope of its incipient 
filtering—though it has not fully shared it with the public—or that 
he is guessing.  The latter seems more likely, particularly given 
difficulties estimating how many sites in a certain category even 
exist.  Australian Internet companies have picked up on this 
vagueness in Labor’s plans, with the carrier relations manager at 
the ISP Internode stating that, “we haven’t got a clear explanation 
as to what the Government’s actual mandatory blacklist looks 
like.”157  Attempts to compel the government under Australia’s 
Freedom of Information Act to reveal the contents of its current, 
more limited ACMA blacklist failed, as the country successfully 
argued that disclosure would undermine law enforcement 
 
154 See, e.g., Bryant, supra note 94 (indicating that child pornography will be 
blocked in Australia). 
155 Senator Conroy Expands Reach of Net Filters to “Unwanted Content,” IT NEWS 
AUSTRALIA, Nov. 13, 2008, http://www.itnews.com.au/News/88908,senator                    
-conroy-expands-reach-of-net-filters-to-unwanted-content.aspx. 
156 DEP’T OF BROADBAND, COMMC’NS AND THE DIGITAL ECON., supra note 117, at 
3. 
157 Asher Moses, Net Filters May Block Porn and Gambling Sites, WATODAY, 
Oct. 27, 2008, available at http://www.watoday.com.au/technology/biz-tech/net       
-filters-may-block-porn-and-gambling-sites-20090616-ce9y.html (quoting John 
Lindsay). 
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efforts.158  Disclosure of the blacklist itself remains illegal,159 though 
a purported copy of it is available on the website Wikileaks.  This 
uncertainty is in sharp contrast to restrictions on offline content, 
where the government publishes categories of banned material.160 
Second, and more troubling, is that the lack of transparency 
about what Internet content will be off-limits to Australians 
prevents them from evaluating how well this blocking relates to 
the Rudd government’s rationales for filtering (as assessed above, 
under Openness).  The primary reason for engaging in mandatory 
access restrictions, according to the Labor Party, is to protect 
children.  The classification scheme developed under the 
Broadcasting Services Amendment is tailored—if inconsistently at 
times—to this end.161  However, making content that might be 
harmful to minors, yet lawful for adults, inaccessible in all 
circumstances runs afoul of the child-protection rationale.  This 
suggests that the government may be adopting, willingly or based 
upon political calculations, a broader filtering rationale that seeks 
to prevent harm to adults themselves or to community mores.162  
Such reasons are defensible, but are not the ones upon which Labor 
was elected.  In short, the Rudd government’s inability, or 
unwillingness, to elucidate a consistent set of content categories 
that will be off-limits, either to all Australians or to minors, 
undermines citizens’ ability to compare concrete plans for filtering 
to the reasons for implementing it initially. 
 
158 Electronic Frontiers Australia, FOI Request on ABA, supra note 69.  
159 See generally ACMA, ACMA LIST OF PROHIBITED AND POTENTIALLY 
PROHIBITED OVERSEAS HOSTED CONTENT, Mar. 19, 2009, http://www.acma.gov.au 
/WEB/STANDARD/pc=PC_311669. 
160 See Conroy Statement, supra note 146 (indicating governmental categories 
and priorities in banning material). 
161 See generally supra notes 56–68 and accompanying text (providing 
background on the classification scheme). 
162 See Testimony Before the Senate Standing Committee on Environment, 
Communications., and the Arts, supra note 145.  The Family First Party, for example, 
advances Internet filtering as a child-protection measure.  See FAMILY FIRST, 
PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM PORNOGRAPHY  (2008), http://www.familyfirst.org.au 
/policy/policypornography.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2009) (providing a discussion 
of this position).  However, it justifies tightening standards for content allowed on 
television because shows such as Big Brother “legitimiz[e] behavior that is 
completely unacceptable,” contravening “decent standards.”  FAMILY FIRST, 
ENSURING DECENT STANDARDS ON TELEVISION (2008) (last visited Dec. 4, 2009), 
http://www.familyfirst.org.au/policy/policytelevisionstandards.pdf. 
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The government appears to recognize shortcomings in the 
transparency of its filtering proposal.  Minister Conroy suggested 
implementing review of the ACMA blacklist, either by an expert 
panel or by a parliamentary committee, to improve 
transparency.163 
At this stage, Australia’s transparency regarding its incipient 
filtering is poor.164 
5.3. Narrowness 
While Australia’s filtering system is not yet in place, the first 
pilot test allows an early estimate of narrowness.  Depending upon 
the filtering product that ISPs deploy (assuming the government 
does not mandate one method), Australia’s censorship could fare 
quite well or rather poorly on the narrowness criterion.  The 
products varied in how successfully they blocked prohibited 
content, and only that content.  The products’ failure to prevent 
access to some sites banned by Australia is puzzling, but likely 
stems from relying on vendors’ block lists rather than the ACMA’s 
list.  This choice—creating a custom block list, or relying on the 
products’ classification schemes—has critical implications for the 
narrowness, accountability, and ease of implementation of 
Australia’s filtering system.  Overall, the country is likely to follow 
the trend towards over-blocking present in most filtering countries, 
both to prevent circumvention and to avoid under-blocking. 
Filtering systems inevitably block both too much information 
(over-breadth) and too little information (under-breadth)—they fail 
to prevent access to some proscribed information, yet also filter 
material that is permitted.  Evaluating narrowness requires 
examining failure rates on both components, accepting that 
perfection is unlikely.  For over-breadth, the results from the first 
Tasmanian test of filtering products varied from good (1.3% of 
innocent sites blocked) to poor (7.8% of such sites blocked).165  For 
under-breadth, Australia’s system performed moderately well: five 
 
163 Dan Harrison, Review of Website Blacklist in Wind, SYDNEY MORNING 
HERALD, May 27, 2009, available at http://www.smh.com.au/news/technology 
/web/review-of-website-blacklist-in-ind/2009/05/26/1243103573711.html. 
164 See generally AUSTRALIAN COMPUTER SOC’Y, supra note 88, at 5 (calling on 
the Australian government to “establish greater transparency and accountability 
in the criteria and processes for incorporating sites onto the black list”). 
165 AUSTRALIAN COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA AUTHORITY, supra note 8, at 62–
68. 
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of the six tested products blocked more than 90% of targeted 
URLs.166  (Compare this, though, with Iran’s success rate of almost 
100% in blocking access to pornography.167) 
It is unclear why the tested products failed to block banned 
sites, and whether this outcome has any implications for full-scale 
implementation.  The ACMA report does not describe precisely 
how filtering was implemented—it details the different categories 
of URLs tested, but crucially does not indicate how the products 
were configured to block them.168  If the test simply fed the URL 
lists for Categories 1 and 2 (the prohibited sites) into a block list for 
each product, the filtering technologies should have achieved 100% 
success, which means that preventing access to a given URL would 
be trivial.  Thus, it is more likely that the test did not check a 
product’s ability to implement a block list, but rather how well its 
filtering system detected and blocked sites that Australia deems 
unlawful or problematic. 
For example, if Australia decided to use Secure Computing’s 
SmartFilter product, it could block access to pornographic sites on 
the ACMA’s list in two ways.  First, it could configure SmartFilter 
to block URLs that Secure Computing classifies as Pornography.169  
Indeed, ISPs such as Webshield have lobbied for this option based 
on effectiveness and performance benefits.170  Second, Australia 
could create its own list of prohibited URLs and configure 
SmartFilter to block them.171  In fact, the two methods could be 
combined, at some risk of redundancy.  Relying upon a vendor’s 
filtering database or categories is easier for a country such as 
Australia, since the government or ISPs do not have to manually 
update block lists, but has the drawback of conferring decision-
making power over what constitutes “pornography” or other 
 
166 Id. 
167 OPENNET INITIATIVE, IRAN (June 16, 2009) http://opennet.net/research 
/profiles/iran  (last visited Dec. 4, 2009). 
168 AUSTRALIAN COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA AUTHORITY, supra note 8, at 20–
22, 35–37. 
169 See MCAFEE: TRUSTEDSOURCE WEB DATABASE REFERENCE GUIDE 59 (2009), 
available at http://www.securecomputing.com/techpubs_download.cfm?id=2066 
(describing pornography category and giving sample URLs). 
170 See generally Foo, supra note 43 (discussing ISP and Webshield’s activities). 
171 See SECURE COMPUTING, SECURE WEB FILTER: PRODUCT OVERVIEW 1 (2008), 
available at http://www.securecomputing.com/pdf/WEBW-URLfltr-PO.pdf 
(“Add your own entries to any one of Secure Web Filter’s categories or create and 
populate your own user-defined categories.”). 
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banned content upon the filtering vendor or other third-party 
block list provider.  It is likely that Australia’s pilot project used 
the first method (using vendors’ classification schemes), but not the 
second, in evaluating filtering products.  If the trial sought to block 
access to a custom URL list—for example, the ACMA’s blacklist—it 
would be surprising if the filtering products failed to achieve 
complete effectiveness.  However, if, Australia should decide to 
configure filtering to block only URLs specified by the ACMA, 
narrowness should improve dramatically when censorship is 
implemented country-wide: current filtering products should 
block specified URLs, and only those URLs, with perfect accuracy 
(absent transient technical problems).172 
While this technical discussion may seem abstruse, it has 
important implications for how Australia’s filtering will work.  If 
the government requires ISPs to block only sites that the ACMA 
classifies as banned, then both under-blocking and over-blocking 
should vanish:  providers can easily configure their networks to 
reject attempts to reach a specified list of prohibited URLs.  If 
filtering employs vendor-supplied block lists, or allows ISPs to 
choose which product to implement (so long as it censors sites on 
the ACMA list with reasonable reliability), then Australia’s 
controls will inevitably be both under-broad and overbroad, with  
negative implications for access to legitimate information, 
transparency, and accountability.  A further problem is that 
filtering, to avoid allowing access to prohibited content, must 
invariably move towards over-blocking.  This is particularly true 
for sites that enable circumvention of filtering, such as 
anonymizers, proxy servers, and even language translation sites.173  
Some sophisticated users will employ these seemingly innocent 
sites to access banned material.174  A filtering government must 
then decide between allowing some (likely low) level of access, or 
expanding blocking to cover sites that are nominally licit but that 
can bypass censorship.  Similarly, it may be necessary to block 
certain ports and Internet protocols, such as SOCKS175 or virtual 
 
172 See generally Foo, supra note 14. 
173 See generally Villeneuve, supra note 96 (discussing the problems these 
websites create). 
174 See CITIZEN LAB, supra note 101 (describing how this occurs). 
175 See Contempt, supra note 97 (stating explicitly the weaknesses in the 
proposed filtering system). 
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private networks,176 to prevent users from employing other 
circumvention techniques.  Indeed, Australia’s technical 
specifications for the second set of tests state that it “will involve 
common circumvention techniques (e.g. use of proxies) and the 
measures that a filtering solution has in place to address these.”177  
Australia is clearly contemplating blocking or preventing 
circumvention.  To be effective, censorship must often target sites 
that bear no direct relation to the material that a country purports 
to ban.  This creates collateral harms, as users may not be able to 
use Google’s cache or translation sites. 
To most effectively prevent access to prohibited sites, filtering 
countries must generally accept over-blocking.  The Tasmanian test 
results illustrate this general trend:  methods that are more 
effective in preventing access to banned material also tend to catch 
more unrelated sites in their filters.  Nations that implement 
filtering in a non-symbolic way—Singapore, for example, blocks 
only a few sites as a gesture of disapproval 178—often tolerate over-
breadth as the price of preventing access to illicit content.179  
Australia faces a similar choice:  the tested product with the 
greatest success in walling off banned sites (lowest under-breadth) 
had the second-worst record in blocking permissible ones (second-
highest over-breadth), while the tested solution with the lowest 





% Prohibited URLs 
Blocked 
% Permissible URLs 
Blocked 
Alpha 90 2.6 
Beta 98 7.5 
Gamma 87 1.3 
Delta 91 2.4 
 
176 See Hendry & Pauli, supra note 3 (giving an example of how a private 
network was used for a circumvention technique). 
177 DEPARTMENT OF BROADBAND, supra note 117, at 6. 
178 See OPENNET INITIATIVE, SINGAPORE 3 (2007) http://opennet.net/research 
/profiles/singapore (2007) (documenting that Singapore’s ISPs block only seven 
pornographic sites). 
179 See, e.g., OPENNET INITIATIVE, SUDAN 4 (2007) http://opennet.net/studies   
/sudan2007 (2007) (describing that a search portal and a site on domestic violence 
had been previously misclassified as pornography and blocked). 
180 AUSTRALIAN COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA AUTHORITY, supra note 8, at 62–
68. 
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Theta 94 7.8 
Omega 94 2.9 
 
TABLE 2 – OVER-BREADTH / UNDER-BREADTH                                               
FROM FILTERING TRIAL181 
 
Perfect censorship is a myth:  banned information inevitably 
leaks through filters, and blocking always strains out wheat along 
with chaff.  The results from Australia’s pilot program indicate that 
its filtering narrowness could be strong or poor, depending on the 
product employed.  The tradeoff that the country and its ISPs 
select, and the resulting balance between over-blocking and under-
blocking, will do much to illuminate the government’s value 
choices. 
5.4. Accountability 
Formally, Australia’s censorship decision makers are highly 
accountable to citizens, yet there are subtle but important concerns.  
Labor’s dependence on minority parties in the Senate can confer 
disproportionate power upon senators with strong views on 
filtering that appear out of step with majority public opinion.  The 
government has moved to silence some dissenters, and is 
considering using block lists developed by foreign entities with no 
accountability and with potentially differing standards for content 
classification.  Filtering itself confers considerable power on those 
who implement it (such as ISPs) and design it technologically (such 
as software vendors), and makes later expansion of censorship 
easier by reducing the cost of blocking additional content. 
Accountability encompasses a range of ways by which citizens 
can participate in filtering decisions.  This can happen directly, as 
when users in Saudi Arabia request that a website be blocked or 
unblocked,182 and also indirectly, as when citizens vote for 
politicians who carry out their preferences.  Ordinarily, Australia 
should score high for accountability:  the country has a robust 
 
181 Id. 
182 Robin Miller, Meet Saudi Arabia’s Most Famous Computer Expert, 
NEWSFORGE, Jan. 14, 2004, http://www.linux.com/archive/articles/33695.  See 
generally ABDULAZIZ HAMAD AL-ZOMAN, THE INTERNET IN SAUDI ARABIA 
(TECHNICAL VIEW) (2001), http://www.isu.net.sa/library/CETEM2001-Zoman 
.pdf (presenting data on the internet in Saudi Arabia). 
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democracy, independent judiciary, written constitution, 
protections for minority groups, and other features of a Western 
democracy.183  Indeed, the government’s responsiveness to public 
opinion is arguably stronger in Australia’s parliamentary 
democracy than in the United States’ republican one:  Australian 
governments unable to command a majority in parliament face a 
near-immediate test at the polls, while U.S. elections occur at 
regular intervals regardless of the particular government’s 
support.  To its credit, the Rudd government has shown a 
willingness to consider feedback on its Internet policies, even from 
skeptics:  the chief executive of the Internet Industry Association 
(“IIA”), who has criticized the filtering proposal, was named to the 
new Cyber-Safety Consultative Working Group promised under 
Labor’s election platform.184  There are, however, several 
worrisome issues regarding accountability in the filtering context. 
One issue is that the Labor government’s policy has shifted in 
the direction of expanding blocking since the election in two ways.  
First, the government seeks to make some blocking (the first tier of 
the system) mandatory for all Australians, although its platform 
indicated that adults could opt out of such restrictions.  The 
government’s lack of transparency regarding its plans makes it 
harder to hold Labor to account for any such shift.  Second, the 
scope of material targeted has broadened.  This may represent the 
policy goals of Minister Conroy or the Rudd government, but the 
change also moves Labor closer to minority parties that advocate 
wider bans, such as Family First.  This situation creates the 
possibility of undue influence by a minority over the majority of 
voters. 
Another concern is that the government appears to be seeking 
to suppress dissent in some cases.185  Mark Newton, an employee 
of the ISP Internode, has actively opposed the filtering plan in 
posts to newsgroups and online forums.186  (Newton makes clear 
 
183 See generally Country Profile: Australia, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk 
/2/hi/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1250188.stm#facts (providing general 
information about Australia and its leaders). 
184 Big Core, CANBERRA TIMES, May 19, 2008, at A13; Press Release, Senator 
Stephen Conroy, Consultative Working Group to improve Cyber-Safety (May 15, 
2008), http://www.minister.dbcde.gov.au/media/media_releases/2008/035. 
185 See generally Hendry & Pauli, supra note 3. 
186 See, e.g., Posting of Mark Newton to http://forums.whirlpool.net.au         
/ forum-replies.cfm?t=967413&r=16774529#r16774529 (Sept. 30, 2008, 4:58 PM) 
(posting in opposition to the filtering plan). 
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that he does not speak for his employer.)187  Belinda Dennett, 
policy advisor to Minister Conroy, sent an e-mail message to the 
IIA stating her “serious concern that a [sic] IIA member would be 
sending out this sort of message.”188  Furthermore, Minister 
Conroy has suggested that opponents of the filtering program 
support child pornography.189  While hyperbolic rhetoric is 
common in democracies, attempts to silence dissenters or to 
conflate policy differences with support for unlawful behavior 
undermine accountability. 
The government has also suggested it will expand ACMA’s 
block list by adding sets of problematic URLs from foreign entities 
that seek to combat child abuse, such as the Internet Watch 
Foundation.190  This would mean that entities that are not 
accountable to Australian voter and applying standards other than 
those set by Australia law, would decide what Internet material is 
off-limits in the country.  While the accountability problem would 
be reduced if the ACMA and Classification Board independently 
assessed the content on the foreign block lists, treating third-party 
block lists as complaints would likely run afoul of the statutory 
scheme under which the ACMA operates.191 
Moreover, filtering itself creates two fundamental 
accountability problems.  First, online censorship using technology 
confers significant power on both the entity implementing filtering 
(such as an ISP) and the entity designing it (such as software 
vendors Websense192 and Secure Computing).193  In Australia’s 
case, it appears that ISPs may be able to choose among different 
 
187 See, e.g., John Timmer, Aussie govt: Don’t Criticize Our (Terrible) ‘Net filters, 
ARS TECHNICA, Oct. 24, 2008 (on file with U. Pa. J. Int’l L.) (criticizing the 
Australian government’s filtering policy). 
188 Asher Moses, Filtering Out the Fury: How Government Tried to Gag Web 
Censor Critics, THE AGE (Melbourne), Oct. 24, 2008, http://www.theage.com.au              
/articles/2008/10/23/1224351430987.html?page=2. 
189 Conroy Announces Mandatory Internet Filters to Protect Children, supra note 
115 (quoting Conroy: “If people equate freedom of speech with watching child 
pornography, then the Rudd-Labor Government is going to disagree”). 
190 See supra notes 79–86 and accompanying text. 
191 See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
192 See Websense Web Filter, http://www.websense.com/content 
/WebFilter.aspx (last visited Dec. 4, 2009) (providing information for the 
Websense filtering product). 
193 See McAfee SmartFilter, http://www.securecomputing.com/index.cfm 
?skey=85 (last visited Dec. 4, 2009) (describing the benefits and features of McAfee 
SmartFilter). 
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products that can censor the Web.194  This could enable ISPs to 
offer filtering Internet access of varying narrowness, all within the 
statutory scheme set forth by the government. 
If Australia’s ISPs use the block lists created by these products’ 
vendors, this will transfer important normative decisions about 
classifying and filtering content from Australia’s government, 
which is accountable, to private companies—which may not be 
Australian in origin or location—that are not.  Australia has a 
detailed legal framework for determining what content is, and is 
not, subject to prohibition.  If filtering is implemented based on 
software vendors’ decisions about whether content is sexually 
explicit, rather than on ACMA’s or the Classification Board’s 
judgments, this decreases citizens’ ability to have a voice in what 
they can access online.  This accountability challenge may also be 
convenient for decision makers, as it lets them displace grievances 
over blocking decisions onto technology companies and portray 
problems as technical in nature rather than reflecting a deliberate 
normative choice.  To improve accountability, the Labor 
government should disclose how it plans to implement filtering at 
the ISP level, including the process by which a site is selected for 
blocking and how that restriction is implemented at a technical 
level.  This will enable Australian citizens to decide whether the 
government’s plan comports with their own views on filtering, and 
to make those views known at the polls. 
Second, once censorship is implemented, the costs and 
difficulties of blocking additional content are greatly reduced.  
Should the Labor government decide to block sites about illegal 
drugs, for example, it could do so using some filtering products 
simply by selecting an additional category as prohibited.195  This 
creates not only a slippery slope problem—once initial reluctance 
to censor is overcome, additional steps may appear less weighty—
but can also make it difficult to determine precisely what content is 
blocked, and why. 196 
 
194 Cf. DEPARTMENT OF BROADBAND, supra note 117, at 2–3. 
195 See, e.g., Secure Computing, http://www.securecomputing.com 
/index.cfm?skey=86#categories (describing the drugs category of sites blocked by 
smartfilter). 
196 Cf. Hendry, supra note 3 (pointing out that a content filtering scheme 
installed in Parliament offices mistakenly blocked legitimate topics like gun 
control and breastfeeding). 
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Accountability problems are inherent in censorship achieved 
through computer technology.  These challenges increase when 
some voices are magnified, and others silenced, in policy debates, 
and when content categorization is done by unaccountable (and 
perhaps foreign) entities.  How Australia implements filtering will 
influence the control its citizens have over online content 
restrictions. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Australia is moving to censor the Internet because the Labor 
Party won office partly on a promise to do so.  The country will 
likely become the first Western democracy to block access to online 
material through legislative mandate, creating a natural 
experiment.  However, this experiment raises concerns.  The 
government has not been clear about what material will be 
blocked, and why.  The censorship system’s accountability to 
citizens could be undercut by the combined effects of pressures to 
win Senate passage of legislation, outsourced content classification, 
and filtering’s inevitable transfer of power to those who design and 
implement its technology.  Results from the first test of filtering 
should be a cautionary tale, guiding not just the technical 
deployment of censorship, but also highlighting political, social, 
and Internet policy issues that must continue to be vigorously 
debated. 
Australia’s decision to censor Internet content preemptively is 
further evidence that the debate over filtering has shifted, from 
whether filtering should occur to how it should work.  
Cyberlibertarianism is alive and well, as discussions in Australia’s 
press and Parliament prove, but it is no longer ascendant.  This 
shift disguises an important change in focus for regulating 
information.  Filtering looks easy and cheap, and calls to block 
access to material that is almost universally condemned—such as 
child pornography, extreme violence, or incitements to terrorism—
are hard to resist.  But this focus confuses means with ends.  The 
key question is what set of measures best achieve the end, or 
combat the evil, at issue—and how tolerable their countervailing 
drawbacks will be.  Democratic governance is well-positioned to 
debate these tradeoffs, and indeed Australia’s move is less 
worrisome than filtering in, for example, Great Britain, which 
implemented censorship through “voluntary” agreements between 
ISPs and government.  The concern is that as filtering is 
increasingly adopted in Western democracies, censorship that 
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blocks access to material rather than legal measures that punish 
access after the fact will become increasingly seen as normal rather 
than problematic.  As this Article, and other work on filtering by 
groups such as the OpenNet Initiative demonstrate, filtering 
carries considerable costs in over-blocking, transparency, and 
accountability that may not be evident initially.  Censorship can be 
an effective tool, but it is a dangerous one.  Australia’s example 
will have much to teach about both aspects. 
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